Abstract-Computer network defense has traditionally been provided using reactionary tools such as signature-based detectors, white/blacklisting, intrusion detection/protection systems, etc. While event detection/correlation techniques may identify threats -those threats are then dealt with manually, often employing obstruction-based responses (e.g., blocking). As threat sophistication grows, we find these perimeter-planted security efforts ineffective in combating competent adversaries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deception has been used throughout history, primarily in warfare. Sun Tzu writes in The Art of War [1] : "All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. This work was also partially funded by the National Science Foundation award number 1303051 CyberCorp Cadre at New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology. far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near."
In modern times, deception has been the province of strategists and psychologists, a study of human perception explicitly applied to warfare. Even as the world has become increasingly engaged in cyberwarfare, deception has accompanied it. A look at deception in cyber research reveals a focus on the human/cognitive component; while this has some import, we should like to reframe the discussion. We hypothesize that given the current evolutions in computing (virtualization) and networking (software-defined networking), we now have a more mutable and forgiving environment to do computer deception across the entire network and operating system stack.
Thus, we approach deception not through a cognitive lens, but rather a technological one. Thus, in this paper we discuss the primitives (host, network, application, data) that enable cyber deception and the tools/techniques have been developed, used, and tested. For these efforts, we discuss the threat model that supports the deployment of deception and also considerations for operationalizing deception.
In Section II we briefly outline the tenets of deception, as defined by military doctrine. Section III then delves into the threat space deception attempts to address. SectionIV provides a high level view of deception as a system, then segueing into V, the technologies. We round the paper with a discussion on bringing deception to operations (Section VI) and the conclusion in VII.
II. THE GUISE OF DECEPTION
Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-13.4 [2] describes Information Operations as"the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC)." These are often referred to as the five pillars or capabilities of information operations. MILDEC is direct result of the personmade cyber domain Computer Network Operations (CNO). JP 3-13.4 provides a lens to understand how to leverage MILDEC to aid in CNO and thus can serve as a basis for understanding its importance across the CNO domain. Relevant functions of MILDEC include:
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• Causing ambiguity, confusion, or misunderstanding in adversary perceptions of friendly critical information.
• Causing the adversary to misallocate personnel, fiscal, and material resources in ways that are advantageous to the friendly force.
• Causing the adversary to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions.
• Conditioning the adversary to specific patterns of friendly behavior to induce adversary perceptions that can be exploited by the joint force. The extension of these functions can be funneled into two factors that drive our approach to cyber deception: the threat and the technology. The notion here is not to bind the deception solely to human/cognitive/"nature"-based techniques (e.g., a chameleon), but rather consider machine-tomachine communications and machine-learning or artificial intelligence (AI)-based attack methods, where there is no human to quantify or qualify a deception techniques efficacy (did it work?) and/or effectiveness (did it deceive?).
III. DEFINING THE THREAT
If we consider threat modeling in terms of the attacker, we must evaluate the attacker's goals (ends), methods (ways), and resources (means). By looking at attack profiles, the threat landscape can be evaluated in terms of what is needed for defense.
The threat landscape has been evolving with approximately 80% of threats categorized as commodity threats, which are carried out by attackers using widely known tools. The next 10% are typically carried out using standard tools by organized crime to make money, but are more directed attacks. Finally, the last 10% are the most pernicious attacks, which include advanced persistent threats (APTs) whose attacks are crafted for a single target [3] .
Commodity attackers may be after fame or fortune, but they typically use script-kiddie quality malware and known vulnerabilities, which require very little expertise and insignificant financial resources. These attacks are widely broadcast, e.g., spam email or port scanning for known vulnerabilities. Commodity attacks are often defensible using best practices, such as patching systems, not opening unsolicited email, etc.
Directed attackers use standard tools sometimes with minor customization, but specifically target higher value assets for financial gain. Such attacks may use additional means, such as drive-by-download attacks. While the targets are specific, they may include many very similar targets leveraging the same ways and means. In this case, the attacker may abandon the attack on targets that are well defended, but proceed to exploit those with minimal defenses. These attacks require some time and expertise to target the attack to the intended victim, e.g., spear phishing. Due to the need for customization, the cost in time and money associated with directed attacks is higher. Defeating directed attacks requires following best practices, monitoring systems, and more security training for users.
APTs require substantial expertise, as the attacker actively analyzes the specific target, attempting a variety of attack vectors (ways) to: (1) achieve an initial foothold; (2) evaluate the tools available on the system, and (3) use victim resources to penetrate further and acquire greater access and resources. APT attack goals include exfiltration of intellectual property, political manipulation, and cyber terror. The unique nature of APTs and the fact that these attacks often use legitimate administrative software, operating system features, cloud services, and security tools (e.g., Mimikatz, PsExec, and WCE) [4] to carry out attacks make them both harder to discover and more difficult to combat once revealed. APTs require extensive forensics and investigation to determine what has been done and halt or merely reduce the impact of the intrusion.
Targeted attacks in 2016 included the use of infected hardware and media, spear phishing, zero-days, custom back door programs, destructive payloads, vulnerabilities (including industrial control system vulnerabilities), worms, advanced surveillance tools, stolen certificates/credentials, and diskwiping. Further, targeted attacks and APTs used executable binary large objects to defeat signature based detection, deployed over networks to avoid disk storage, and limited deployment to specific targets. The integration of such techniques makes standard defenses less effective.
Given the average time to discover a breach at 200 days [7] , the length of time that an APT can require to analyze and thwart, the average number of identities exposed per breach being 927k in 2016 [4] , and the average total cost of a data breach reaching $3.62M in 2017 [6] , it is more critical than ever that we use all of the tools within reach to reduce exposure to cyber security threats. Cyber deception provides another mechanism to thwart attackers or to at least begin to level the playing field between defenders and attackers. Given that attackers are using legitimate security tools against systems, it essential that high value systems use active defense that integrates deception.
IV. A SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION OF DECEPTION
Consider a system S that is comprised of one or more components C k . Each of these components may be treated as a black box with some number of inputs I 1..n and outputs O 1..m . A set of inputs I(X) provides a mapping to one or many outputs, O(Y ). There are three measures of truth for this process.
1) With regard to I, are the inputs truthful with regard to the system and to the constraints (e.g., type) of the input? 2) With regard to the mapping, for a set I(X), is the mapping to O(Y ) consistent and truthful? 3) With regard to O, are the outputs truthful with respect to the output type(s) and the system as well? When considering an emulation of the system S as S , the measure of truth in each of these is based on the perception, either directly or indirectly, of O(Y ) given I(Y ); we define this perception as P (Figure 1 ). The appropriate definition of the fidelity F for S may be described as P/P . The metric F may also be used to describe the aim of the deception, as F tends to 1, the aim of the deception tends toward realism; as F tends to 0, the deception tends toward confusion.
In the cyber domain, we can define this system as a collection of interconnected nodes, where each node consists of a computational component and communications component. Layers in each of the components provide conduits through which information is ingested (I), produced (O) and perceived (F ); its this latter attribute that can be leveraged for deception. The variability of inputs and outputs facilitate the ease with which a deception can be generated; greater variability provides more wiggle room to instill falseness, confusion or targeted deception (e.g., to lead the deceivee to a conclusion or down a path). For each conduit, there must (or should) be an established or understood truth. This truth must also consider purpose within greater context of the system in which it inhabits. For example, an IP address on an internetfacing host only has value if it is routable (i.e., not a private IP address). Thus, each layer, as a technology, should be defined not only by its selectable attributes (values/properties), but also how they are used in the system. How they are used provides meaning; it is meaning that drives the impetus to deceive in that layer. Thus, each layer's definition depends heavily on the enabling technology to produce deception, in the context of "host" or "network" based deceptions. Given the singular nature of a deception technique, techniques may be combined to enable composable deceptions or "hybrid" approaches.
Hence, we reframe the foundation of cyber deception on the enabling technology. When we consider host-based capabilities, deceptions can be based on hardware, firmware, operating systems (OS), OS components (kernel, memory, CPU, Input/Output), applications and users. For the networking plane, deceptions can be based on the physical layer (media/bits), data link layer (frame/ethernet/RF), network layer (IP), transport layer (TCP/UDP), and application layer (session, presentation, application). Hybrid deceptions may include any number of host and network deceptions. Section V delves into deception approaches and techniques based on these technology bases.
V. THE TECHNOLOGY OF CYBER DECEPTION A. General Taxomony
In his thesis, Almeshekah [5] defines deception as a misperception that is intentionally induced by others. This definition is further elaborated in [8] to describe an act of deception as being composed of two components: dissimulation and simulation.
The goal of dissimulation is to hide the truth. Almeshekah and Spafford provide three categories of actions that can accomplish this act: masking, repackaging, and dazzling.
• Masking: Masking mechanisms operate by making the truth unable to be detected.
• Repackaging: Repackaging mechanisms operate by making the truth appear to be something else.
• Dazzling: Dazzling mechanisms operate by making the truth difficult to be distinguished from false information. The goal of simulation is to portray false information as being true. Almeshekah and Spafford also provide three categories of actions that can accomplish this act: mimicking, inventing, and decoying.
• Mimicking: Mimicking mechanisms operate by having the deceiver portray the false information in such a way that it appears to be the truth.
• Inventing: Inventing mechanisms operate by creating entirely new information that appears to be truthful.
• Decoying: Decoying mechanisms operate by attracting the adversaries' attention away from the truth. We leverage this taxonomy for the remainder of this survey.
B. General Deception
A large amount of research has been done in the field of deception, ranging from literature on military tactics to recent papers investigating these same strategies within the cyber domain. In their highly-cited work Hutchins, Cloppert, and Amin [9] develop the idea of a kill-chain with relation to cyber operations. The concept of a kill-chain is that an adversary must succeed in a chain of actions in order to successfully perform an attack. A defender should attempt to detect and mitigate adversaries as early as possible within the killchain in order to foil the attack. The authors identify several steps in the kill-chain in which deceptive techniques can be deployed. Many of the works that follow refer to this concept.
Several papers also refer to Stolls 1989 book, The Cuckoos Egg [10] , as an early example of deceptive techniques used in relation to computer security. As offensive cyber operations have become more prevalent, techniques have been developed to defend against them. One of the most widely used concepts is that of a honeypot [11] . As seen in Section V-C, much of the work being done today is an extension of this original idea.
Extensive work has been done to develop a taxonomy of deceptive techniques with respect to cyber operations [8] . However, it is important to note the taxonomy developed in [12] . In this work, the author maps a classification of deceptive techniques developed by linguistics researchers to possible use cases in cyberspace. While several of these techniques may
A number of surveys exist that attempt to evaluate and categorize existing deception techniques. The author of [12] provides a brief summary of early general techniques. In their 2012 survey, Bringer et al. [8] evaluated over 80 papers on honeypot research, categorized into disparate honeypot architecture techniques, ways to use data generated by honeypots, honeypot configurations, antidetection techniques, and legal/ethical implications of using honeypots.
Rauti and Leppanen [14] further the investigation by looking into the types of entity falsification techniques. They review general techniques that falsify single hosts and networks, as well as more novel approaches such as those that falsify filesystem metadata information or system calls. Their work provides well-detailed material for understanding the various entities that honeypots aim to leverage.
A 2014 survey by Okhravi et al. [15] investigates the use of moving targets in cyber-defense, a concept closely related to the use of deception. The authors build upon their previously published technical report [16] , which details many specific moving target strategies, to enumerate five different categories dynamic networks, platforms, runtimes, software, and data along with analyses of weaknesses and potential research.
C. Techniques
In this section, we discuss deception techniques proposed by academia, as well as those offered by industry. We categorize these techniques based upon their targeted defense surface (host, network, hybrid) and further classify these approaches using the taxonomy described in Section V-A.
1) Host-based Techniques:
Host-based deception techniques deceive adversaries by falsifying entities within the targeted device (e.g., virtual machine (VM), filesystem, etc.). Bringer et al. [13] discusses many host-based techniques in their survey. Topics include using system agents to launch ondemand honeypot VMs, as well as enhanced VM introspection using internal and external sensor instrumentation. Rauti et al. [14] explore entities that can be used to guide adversaries into honeypots, discussing usage of: files, specific file content, databases, specific database records, data in RAM, filesystem metadata, user accounts, registry data, and operating system interfaces (e.g., system call numbering).
Patch-based Vulnerability Hiding. A major trend in recent literature involves hiding available vulnerabilities from adversaries, specifically in relation to software patches.
Honey Patches [17] : The concept of a honey patch is to make a patched server reply to an adversary similar to how a non-patched server would. This avoids leaking information by providing an error message indicating that the system is no longer vulnerable to a specific exploit. It then produces a container that appears to be a vulnerable system but with redacted information hidden from the adversary.
Unfortunately, this technique is extremely difficult to deploy, due to the complexity associated with generating patches that both fix a vulnerability and provide indications to an adversary that it is still vulnerable. Honey patches employ dazzling by making it difficult to distinguish between vulnerable and non-vulnerable hosts and invent new containers as honeypots.
Ghost Patches: In [18] , the authors take a similar approach, creating software patches that contain both real and false vulnerability fixes. They exploit a major method adversaries use to find vulnerabilities: reverse-engineering software patches. The goal of their approach is to waste an adversarys time by including "fake fixes" in patches that hint towards vulnerabilities that do not actually exist.
This technique is relatively easy to deploy. The authors provide an example compiler that is run on standard patch files and outputs a patch file that also includes the "fake fixes". Their ghost patches use dazzling techniques to distract from actual patched vulnerabilities and use mimicking and decoying techniques to fool an adversary into believing they successfully used an exploit.
Commercial. Private industry cybersecurity products are commonly host-based. Novo [19] [20] is an enterprise scale cybersecurity solution developed by Allure Security/Columbia, automatically deploys decoy documents ("honey files") into client filesystems to detect and monitor intruders. Opened documents that have been planted by the system report alerts when modified. The system also works to minimize the number of false positives from authorized users. Another similar product by Rapid7, InsightIDR [21] , centralizes honey-related (honeypots, honey files, honey accounts, etc.) management to track adversaries and identify credential misuse.
2) Network-based Techniques: Network-based deception techniques deceive adversaries by falsifying entities within the targeted devices network. Bringer et al. [13] discuss several network-based techniques in their work. Papers surveyed included techniques such as monitoring routing protocol attacks (e.g., RIP, OSPF), and hierarchical honeypots with low-fidelity wide-scoped introspection that pass "interesting" adversaries to systems containing higher-fidelity introspection based on traffic patterns. Rauti et al. [14] explore the entities that can be falsified to direct adversaries into honeypots. They cite papers discussing usage of network services, generation of specific packets, false network servers, and entirely fake networks.
Covert Authentication. In [22] , the authors propose a novel way of using covert messages during two-factor authentication. Their technique uses a cell phone application that reads a nonced QR code generated by a server. The application then prompts the user with possible messages to send to the server covertly and uses these two values to generate a reply to the server. The server can then act accordingly in how it serves the user, possibly directing the user to a honeypot or restricting write-access.
This technique is relatively simple to deploy. Existing two factor authentication schemes already use cell-phones, so deployment can be achieved through an application update. This technique enhances the existing capability by allowing the user to send covert messages to the server.
We classify this technique as being network-based since it uses the existing two-factor authentication mechanism to send additional information without informing the adversary. Upon receiving these messages, the server is able to modify how it treats the user, including directing an untrusted user to an environment with false data and observation capabilities. This technique employs repackaging by making covert messages appear to be traditional two-factor authentication messages and mimicking by possibly redirecting the adversary to a false environment.
Dynamic Networking. In 2001, Kewley et al. [23] introduced the concept of injecting dynamic changes into a network. They obfuscated host addresses by implementing a network address translation (NAT) layer that continually changes outwardfacing identity information such as IP addresses and TCP/UDP port numbers. The authors showed that such techniques are useful in detecting intrusions.
Further development in [24] has built upon this concept. Leveraging advances in software-defined networking, the authors create a system of subnet switches and a central network controller to implement their host address randomization. This process would be difficult and expensive to implement if relying on traditional physical infrastructure. Their work shows that dynamic networking techniques can be used to protect hosts from internal reconnaissance in addition to external threats.
This technique employs dazzling techniques on targeted systems by mimicking false or transitory network configurations.
Commercial. Dynamic networking techniques like those discussed above are not restricted to an academic contextmany commercial products also include them. Centra [25] , developed by security startup GuardiCore, detects intruders and dynamically reroutes threats over the network to high-fidelity Windows and Linux-based honeypots for further analysis of malicious activity. Similarly, Illusive Networks deceptionbased solution, Illusions Everywhere [26] , automatically creates an entire network of decoys when any attack is detected. It makes use of machine-learning to mimic real traffic and data to further deceive adversaries.
3) Hybrid Techniques: Hybrid deception techniques deceive adversaries using techniques that involve a combination of host-based and network-based techniques.
Deception Networks. Sandia continues to develop techniques that explicitly combine host-based and network-based deception techniques. Their eponymous High-Fidelity Adaptive Deception & Emulation System (HADES) [27] duplicates existing network infrastructure and forks connected endpoint virtual machines to entrap attackers, observe malicious behavior, and protect production systems. Individual duplicated virtual machines can be deceptively modified through introspection and dynamically make use of many of the previouslydiscussed host-based deception techniques in a way that is easily deployed and cost-effective.
The hybridization of network and host deception combines a wide variety of deceptive components discussed in Section 1.1 masking, dazzling, mimicking, and decoying to increase the effectiveness of the deception.
Commercial. Many market products contain both host-and network-based components, but rely primarily on one or the other. DeceptionGrid [28] , developed by TrapX for large systems, operates a series of layered deception strategies. The product initially injects fake honeytokens and emulated traffic into the client network. As an attack progresses, the system emulates targeted systems on-demand to direct attacking behavior away from production systems. Finally, the product can fully emulate high-value systems that can interact with adversaries until the attack subsides.
VI. DISCUSSION: OPERATIONALIZING DECEPTION
Operationalizing deception begins with organizational motive. For example, is the purpose of deception to negatively impact adversary activities, to learn adversary tactics, or something else? Once the organization has a clear objective, the deception must be implemented as a program within the organization, such that the effectiveness of the program can be measured, resources can be directed, and changes can be made to improve the program to serve objectives.
When establishing a deception program, it is important to focus on a target adversary; small threats require small sticks, but as is the case with APT-based threats, sophisticated measures should lead the cart. This implies knowledge of adversary tactics and intent. This is because deception is not a passive exercise. Deception is adversary engagement. As such, a successful deception program must employ people, processes, and technologies to engage the adversary in a manner that fits the program's objectives.
It is also important to focus on where or when to engage the adversary. This requires understanding the terrain and manipulating it to shape the adversary actions. The goal is to create a perception that the adversary is making progress in achieving its goals within the terrain. Hence, the IT environment must match adversary expectations. Since adversaries develop expectations via reconnaissance, it is important to have deception built into the operational environment. Deception efforts that utilize honeypots or sandboxes are easily discovered due to their deterministic qualities as well as their lack of expected diversity.
To match adversary expectations, the deception program must be deployed in a manner that is sustainable. One way to achieve that is to ensure that tooling required for deception is part of organizational IT processes. This includes integrating the deception technologies with operational technologies, e.g., authentication systems, API management, change control processes, monitoring infrastructure, enterprise reporting, and alerting tools. Ideally, the deception program must not require any exceptions from IT governance. But if exceptions are required, technical controls must be in place to ensure sustainability of the exceptions. Outages or variations in IT exception management may tip the adversary.
At a tactical level, the deception program must employ an operational model to observe the adversary, engage the adversary, terminate the engagement, learn from the engagement, and to modify tools/tactics/procedures. This loop will enable deception program advancements and will keep the adversary engaged. This is important because any engagement with the adversary is a learning opportunity for the adversary. The adversary will adapt with each learning. Therefore, the deception program must also account for an improved adversary.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we discussed the need for deception with regard to current threats and the notion of approaching cyber deception based on technology. This led to briefly survey a large body of work on deception techniques used in CNO. The techniques were categorized as: host-base, network-based, or hybrid.
Host-based deception generally tend to use honeypot-based techniques by luring adversaries into sandbox environments with introspection capabilities. Modern developments in hostbased deception explore more novel entities that can be falsified. Additionally, recent techniques aim to improve software patching by building honeypots into software patches and to hide the vulnerabilities that patches fix. Network-based deception techniques aim to hide assets and leverage advances in dynamic networking. Through the use of software-defined networking, network-based solutions make it difficult for adversaries to hide their attacks. Hybrid-solutions combine many of these techniques to create extensive deception capabilities, such as routing adversaries to cloned networks created on demand.
Most approaches tend to employ dazzling techniques, making "true" assets difficult to distinguish from honeypots; few focused on fidelity. Additionally, most techniques tended to target entire host or network features; few focused on hybridization.
Further research could be conducted into ways to employ deception at the data level (e.g., within a production machine, having false data generated when an attack is occurring), masking (making the truth inaccessible), or repackaging (making the truth appear to be something else). With regard to hybrid solutions, as deceptive layers are combined to produce deception systems, more research can be done on the effect/impact of those deceptions, such as metrics and measurement to assess the security state of the system and how adjacent systems may be combined to form greater deceptions.
Though there were many techniques to do deception, few outlined the pre/-effects of deception, e.g., the course of action taken before, during, or after a deception to derive additional value or the notion of extending deceptions after engagement for other objectives, aside from cyber-defense.
Cyber deception shows great promise in the domain of cyber security, as the technologies to support host and network dynamism may be used as resources to manuever and deceive the adversary. However, there is still much research that can be done to take deceptions from simple, single point techniques to effective system-based solutions.
